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*Comp. Law. 325 Engaged as it is in the Herculean task of drafting the Companies Bill, the DTI
would be well advised to consider the implications of Smith v. Henniker-Major & Co. 1 This case has
spawned four judgments in the higher courts, each giving a different reading to section 35A of the
Companies Act 1985, leaving the law in a highly unsatisfactory state.
The facts were these. A company purported to assign a right of action against its solicitors to a
director, S, who subsequently issued proceedings. The “meeting” of the board which approved the
assignment was inquorate. The solicitors applied for summary judgment on the ground that the
assignment did not bind the company and so S had no entitlement to sue them. S contended that he
was a “person dealing with a company” within section 35A(1) with the result that “the power of the
board of directors to bind the company” could be “deemed to be free of any limitation under the
company's constitution” (it being further asserted that the quorum requirement of two in the
company's articles was a “limitation”).2
Rimer J. had first bite at the cherry, and, while his judgment3 has attracted some adverse comment,4 it
is logical and clear. He concluded that section 35A only applies to powers exercised by a properly
constituted board. Unless quorate, the board cannot act and until the point is reached where there is
a board capable of transacting business on the company's behalf, the provision is not engaged. The
implications of this reasoning may be unpalatable given that the object of the provision and the
underlying Directive5 is security of transaction, but they are crystal clear. Any counterparty dealing
with an inquorate board is not protected by section 35A and would have to rely on the indoor
management rule.6 A quorum requirement is not a “limitation” but rather a pre-condition to the
exercise of board power. The onus is on the counterparty to verify that she is dealing with the board
and/or to protect herself by insisting that the company execute a written contract or deed in the
manner provided for by section 36A.
A majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that S could not rely on section 35A to validate the
assignment but disregarded Rimer J.'s forceful reasoning. Instead, they sought to read down section
35A to say that a director in S's position was not “a person” within section 35A(1). Carnwath L.J.
accepted that the phrase “person dealing with a company” is wide enough to include a director.
However, he refused to accept that S who “was not simply a director dealing with the company, and
having some incidental involvement in the decision”7 could rely on section 35A to cure a problem that
arose from his own failure to comply with the constitution.8 In interpreting section 35A, the judge saw
no reason why the court “should not be guided by what the common law would deem appropriate in a
similar context”, drawing support from Morris v. Kanssen ,9 a case in which the House of Lords
refused to allow a director to rely on the indoor management rule. Schiemann L.J. reached a similar
conclusion, construing the phrase “person dealing with the company” so as to exclude “the very
directors who overstepped the limitations in the company's constitution”.10
This amounts to a deliberate attempt by the majority to engineer a result going against S while leaving
open the possibility that genuine outsiders dealing with an inquorate board may be able to rely on the
statute.11 However, the gloss put on the statutory language is questionable. The term “person” is
unqualified and demands an all-inclusive construction. The concept of “third parties” in the underlying
Directive is similarly unqualified.12 The point is reinforced by section 322A which qualifies section 35A
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by providing that a transaction with a director or connected person is voidable at the instance of the
company where the board of directors has exceeded any constitutional limitation on its powers. The
natural way to read the provisions is to treat section 322A as restricting the otherwise all-embracing
scope of section 35A.13 The implication of the majority approach is that some transactions with
director-counterparties will be invalid whereas others will be saved by section 35A only to be rendered
voidable by section 322A.14 However, there is little indication beyond the circumstances of the case
itself as to the criteria that should be applied to determine whether a particular director-counterparty
falls within section 35A(1). Carnwath L.J.'s reliance on the Turquand rule to fashion a criterion of
exclusion only raises more questions, not least the legitimacy of using the common law to interpret
section 35A.15 Further litigation will be required to resolve the crucial questions left outstanding--what
is meant by “board of directors”,16 and is a quorum requirement a “limitation”?--a situation that is
hardly desirable.
Robert Walker L.J.'s dissenting judgment is superior to those of the majority because it grapples with
the circularity lying at the heart of section 35A. The counterparty will not have dealt with a board of
directors having actual authority to bind the company because, by definition, the provision is
concerned to validate transactions entered into in excess of board power. It follows that dealings with
something less than the board must be capable of being treated as dealings with “the board” for the
purposes of section 35A. In Robert Walker L.J.'s view, for section 35A to be engaged there must be at
least “a genuine decision taken by a person or persons who can on substantial grounds claim to be
the board of directors acting as such (even if the proceedings of the board are marred by procedural
irregularities of a more or less serious character)”.17 A procedural requirement can therefore be
treated as a limitation on board power.18 Thus, the judge tries to solve the problem by introducing the
vague concept of a de facto board. While his approach is logical, it too would be a recipe for further
litigation, a point he effectively concedes.19
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that we would be better off with the certainty of Rimer J.'s ruling
even though it throws some onus back onto the counterparty. At least everyone would know where
they stood. In its present form, clause 17 of the Companies Bill (the proposed replacement for
sections 35A and 322A) would still apply only to acts of “the board”. The questions left open by
Henniker-Major would remain open and the costs of resolving them would rest squarely on
companies and those that do business with them. The DTI should take note, have yet another look at
the Directive and revisit clause 17.
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